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Abstract This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by
successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-deductive
traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two approaches is subse-
quently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. It is then argued
that this synthetic account makes a useful contribution from both a historical and a
systematic perspective.
1 Introduction
There are two grand tradition in qualitative confirmation theory: hypothetico-
deductive (H-D) confirmation and confirmation by instances, usually linked to the
name of Carl G. Hempel. However, both the classical H-D account and Hempel’s
confirmation by instances have severe shortcomings, as has been noted a number of
times (Glymour 1980a, b; Gemes 1998). These problems were partly addressed by
the efforts of Glymour (1980a), Schurz (1991) and Gemes (1993), but their
resolutions of these difficulties came at the expense of simplicity and transparency.
For instance, the perhaps best game in town (Gemes 1993) relativizes the
confirmation relation to the ‘natural axiomatization’ of a theory.
Therefore, this paper has two principal aims: First, it is shown that the basic
Hempelian and H-D intuitions can be synthesized into a single (albeit restrictive)
account, which may be regarded as the ‘core’ of qualitative confirmation. Notably,
the logical formalism required for the synthesis is very parsimonious. The two
traditions might thus be closer to each other than previously thought, in particular by
Hempel himself. Second, it is shown that the synthetic account circumvents the
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standard objections to H-D and instance confirmation, gets the paradigmatic
examples right and can be extended to the confirmation of entire theories. Thus, the
synthesis is interesting from a historical and a systematic perspective.
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 gives a brief motivation of qualitative
confirmation theory vis-a`-vis quantitative approaches. Section 3 presents H-D and
instance confirmation, as well as their problems. Section 4 introduces the principal
technical tool of the paper—Ken Gemes’ content parts. Section 5 uses content parts
to synthesize Hempelian and H-D confirmation, whereas Sect. 6 extends the
definition to the confirmation of entire theories. Section 7 discusses the synthetic
account and concludes.
2 Why I Am not Always a Bayesian
As of today, purely qualitative, syntactic accounts of confirmation have largely been
superseded by quantitative accounts such as Bayesianism. Therefore, I consider it
necessary to devote some lines to motivating the pursuit of a qualitative
confirmation criterion.
There is a popular prejudice that with the advent and success of Bayesianism, the
study of the qualitative dimension of confirmation has become obsolete. Bayesians
model the beliefs of scientists by means of probability functions, and explicate
degree of confirmation as the credibility boost that a tested hypothesis receives in
the face of the evidence. This seems to be a comprehensive model of learning from
experience that subsumes qualitative accounts as special cases.1
Being a Bayesian myself, I do not want to question the merits of Bayesian
inference. However, it can hardly be a complete theory of confirmation in science.
Sure, since modern science displays a strong focus on data analysis and statistical
inference, it lends itself naturally to Bayesian analysis. But most practitioners
eschew Bayesian inference for its alleged lack of scientific objectivity and
impartiality and prefer the frequentist account of statistical inference. In addition,
even Bayesian statisticians do not always treat prior probabilities as a faithful
expression of their subjective uncertainty. Recently, some of them surmised that
testing complex statistical models rather follows a hypothetico-deductive than an
inductivist Bayesian methodology (Borsboom and Haig 2013; Gelman and Shalizi
2012, 2013).
What is more, it may be questioned whether increase of degree of belief is a good
explicatum for confirmation in strictly deterministic contexts. Think of Kepler’s
laws and Tycho Brahe’s observations of the orbit of Mars, or Lavoisier’s refutation
of the phlogiston theory in his experiments on combustion. In these and similar
cases, Bayesianism is, rather than an explication of scientific confirmation, an
instrument to measure its extent. It does not describe the structure of confirmatory
arguments in the physical sciences up to the 19th century, precisely because these
arguments were usually non-probabilistic.
1 See Kuipers (2000) for an extended discussion of qualitative versus Bayesian confirmation theory.
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Moreover, the outcomes of scientific experiments often constitute intersubjec-
tively compelling evidence for a specific theory (Glymour 1980a, 93). A Bayesian
does not fully explain this agreement since any posterior could be justified by
choosing appropriate priors; ruling out extreme priors would seem to be ad hoc.
These problems are not unique to Bayesianism. Basically, all quantitative
approaches to confirmation that are based on subjective epistemic attitudes under
uncertainty (e.g., Dempster-Shafer theory, ranking functions) are vulnerable to the
same objections. Moreover, many objections to qualitative confirmation theory
(e.g., the tacking by conjunctions problem that we encounter in the next section)
carry over to Bayesianism and other quantitative theories.
Thus, if we are interested in what scientists (and historians of science) refer to
when talking about confirmatory arguments from evidence to theory, a qualitative
study of logical relations between theory and evidence remains indispensable. It
supplements quantitative confirmation theory in an important respect.
Among the qualitative approaches to confirmation, there are two grand traditions.
One prominent proposal has been made by William Whewell:
Our hypotheses ought to foretel phenomena which have not yet been observed
[. . .] the truth and accuracy of these predictions were a proof that the
hypothesis was valuable and, at least to a great extent, true. (Whewell 1847,
62–63)
Modeling empirical support by successful (deductive) prediction is the bottom line
of the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) model of confirmation. From the hypothesis
under test and some auxiliary assumptions, we derive empirical predictions that
confirm, if verified, the original hypothesis. For instance, a physicist will test the
harmonic oscillator model captured by the equation €x þ x2x ¼ 0 for swinging
pendula by deriving its consequences for a particular pendulum. If the predictions of
the oscillator model are verified, they confirm the harmonic oscillator model, if not,
they refute it.
Moreover, the H-D model resembles the ‘conjectures and refutations’-model of
scientific progress (Popper 1934/71): hypotheses have to be subjected to severe tests
in order to gain corroboration. This fact distinguishes it among all qualitative
accounts of confirmation. It is thereby an attractive model for those who are
reluctant to assign degrees of belief in the truth of a scientific hypothesis (a
presumption of Bayesianism) but who believe that by subjecting a hypothesis to
severe tests and failing to observe refutations, it can be corroborated and favored
over others. H-D confirmation may be regarded as the non-probabilistic counterpart
of those philosophies of inductive learning that emphasize severe testing of
statistical hypotheses (e.g., Mayo 1996) versus subjective belief updating. For these
reasons, it still deserves the attention of philosophers of science.
3 H-D Versus Hempelian Confirmation
Classical formulations of H-D confirmation such as
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(H-D) Evidence E confirms hypothesis H relative to background knowledge
K if and only if
1. H.K is consistent;
2. H.K entails E;
3. K alone does not entail E.
have several substantial shortcomings. First, we often want to say that the results of
a scientific experiment do not only support an isolated hypothesis, but speak in favor
of an entire theory consisting of several interrelated models or theories (e.g.,
Dietrich and Moretti 2005). (H-D) does not specify how entire theories, or major
parts thereof, are confirmed, as opposed to the confirmation of single hypotheses.
Second, (H-D) is unable to cope with the tacking by disjunction problem: if
E confirms a hypothesis H relative to K; E _ E0 confirms the same H for an arbitrary
E0 as long as K does not entail E _ E0. So, the predictions of the harmonic oscillator
model about a swinging pendulum or the observation of a single black raven would
confirm that swinging pendula obey the harmonic oscillator equation.
This objection exploits the fact that any logical consequence of H, however
partial it is, still counts as a prediction of H and thus confirms it. In other words,
classical H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance.
Third, there is an analogous tacking problem that already troubled Hempel in his
‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’ (Hempel 1945/65). Hempel discusses various
adequacy criteria for qualitative confirmation and also considers the
Converse Consequence Condition (CCC): If E confirms H and H0 entails H,
then E also confirms H0.
Taking the example E = H = ‘a is a raven’ and H0 ¼ ‘Hooke’s law holds and a is a
raven’, Hempel observes first that E confirms H according to what he calls the
Entailment Condition and concludes: ‘here, the rule that whatever confirms a given
hypothesis also confirms any stronger hypothesis becomes an entirely absurd
principle’ (Hempel 1945/65, 32–33). Formally, this is the flip side of the problem of
irrelevant disjunctions: namely the possibility of tacking irrelevant conjunctions to the
confirmed hypothesis H. That is, if E confirms H relative to K according to (H-D), then
E also confirms H.X for any X such that {H, X, K} is a consistent set of propositions.
Since CCC invites to such irrelevant conjunctions, Hempel rejects the principle
and the associated hypothetico-deductive intuition in favor of a different account of
confirmation that focuses on deriving instances of a hypothesis. This is the second
grand tradition in confirmation theory. The idea goes back to Jean Nicod (1925)
who modeled l’induction par confirmation as the discovery of instances of a
hypothesis under test (see also Glymour 1980a). Planet orbits are instances of
Kepler’s laws. Swinging pendula instantiate the harmonic oscillator. Black ravens
instantiate the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Hempel (1943, 1945/65)
provided the first rigorous formalization of this idea by demanding that the evidence
entail the development of the hypothesis to the domain of the evidence. This is quite
different from the H-D account where the deductive arrow goes from the hypothesis
to the evidence.
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The core of Hempel’s formalization is captured by the satisfaction criterion:
(Hempel) Evidence E (directly) confirms hypothesis H relative to background
knowledge K if and only if E.K entails the development of H for E, that is, the
restriction of H to the set of singular terms that occur essentially in E.2
Formally, (Hempel) amounts to E.K ` H|E. However, this criterion is vulnerable
to equally strong, perhaps devastating, criticism. (Hempel) is monotonous with
respect to background knowledge, that is, the addition of more background
knowledge cannot destroy the confirmation relation. This can lead to disastrous
consequences. Consider the hypothesis H = V x: (Rx ? Bx) that all ravens are
black, and the evidence E ¼ :Ba::Ra that we observe a non-black non-raven.
Hempel (1945/65) makes a convincing case that such a piece of evidence may
confirm the raven hypothesis as long as we do not know beforehand that a is no
raven: such observations rule out potential counterexamples to the raven hypothesis.
For instance, if we observe a grey bird that resembles a raven, then finding out that it
was a crow supports the raven hypothesis.
However, Hempel’s own account of confirmation is inconsistent with this
analysis (Fitelson and Hawthorne 2010): relative to the background knowledge
K ¼ :Ra (‘a is no raven’), E:K ¼ :Ba::Ra implies H|E = (Ra ? Ba). Although
the color of birds known to be crows or swans cannot tell us anything about the truth
of the raven hypothesis, E Hempel-confirms H relative to K in this example, creating
an unacceptable confirming instance.
Apparently, two different concepts of confirmation operate in both accounts (cf.
Huber 2008, 183–186). While the H-D account follows a deductivist rationale by
means of checking the predictions of a hypothesis, the satisfaction criterion
(Hempel) is more inductivist: it generalizes logical entailment from evidence to
theory (cf. the set of adequacy criteria in Hempel 1943, 127–128). To see this more
clearly, note that if evidence E confirms H according to (Hempel), it also confirms
any consequence of H. For the H-D account satisfying CCC, it is precisely the other
way round.
Having both properties at the same time leads to a well-known triviality result
that any evidence confirms any hypothesis. So Hempel concluded that we have to
choose between the two approaches. But instead of making such a choice, I would
like to characterize those cases where both approaches agree. This synthetic account
may then be regarded as the core of qualitative confirmation. To this end, the next
section introduces a logical tool: content parts.
4 Content Parts
The source of the problem of irrelevant disjunction is the property of first-order
logic that well-formed formulas (wffs) sometimes have irrelevant consequences: for
instance, the conclusion in Fa ` (Fa _ Ga) contains the irrelevant element Ga. We
2 Definition 2 will make this notion precise in modern logical terms. See Hempel (1943) for the original
account.
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need a means of discerning irrelevant disjuncts in the consequens of a logical
entailment.
Ken Gemes’ (1997) concept of content parts achieves that goal by analyzing
relevance relations between wffs. For the sake of simplicity, I presuppose a first
order predicate language L without identity, but the extensions are straightforward.3
The following definition captures an intuitive view of relevance relations
between two wffs:
Definition 1 An atomic well-formed formula (wff) b is relevant to a wff a if and
only if there is some model M of a such that: if M0 differs from M only in the value
b is assigned, M0 is not a model of a.
Intuitively, b is relevant for a if in at least in one model of a the truth value of b
cannot be changed without making a false. In other words, the truth value of a is not
fully independent of the truth value of b. A particularly interesting application of
this account of relevance is the notion of the domain and the development of a wff.
Definition 2 The domain of a well-formed formula a is the set of singular terms
that occur in the atomic wffs that are relevant for a. The development of a
universally quantified wff a for another wff b, written a|b, is the restriction of a to
the domain of b, that is, we evaluate the truth value of a with respect to the domain
of b.
For instance, the domain of Fa.Fb is {a, b} whereas the domain of Fa.Ga is {a},
and the development of V x: Fx for Fa::Gb is Fa.Fb.
Moreover, we can define the notion of a relevant model which assigns truth
values to all and only the relevant atomic wffs:
Definition 3 A relevant model of a wff a is a model of a that assigns truth values
to all and only those atomic wffs that are relevant to a.
So relevant models remain silent on the truth values of irrelevant atomic wffs.
This allows us to define the notion of a content part, where in addition to logical
entailment, all relevant models of the consequens can be extended to relevant
models of the antecedens:
Definition 4 For two wffs a and b, b is a content part of a (a `cp b) if and only if
1. a and b are contingent;
2. a logically entails b;
3. every relevant model of b has an extension which is a relevant model of a.
The content part relation forbids irrelevant disjunctions in the conclusion. For
instance, Fa _ Ga is no content part of Fa because the model that assigns ‘false’ to
Fa and ‘true’ to Ga is a relevant model of Fa _ Ga, but cannot be extended to a
model of Fa. The content part relation marks such deductions as irrelevant.
3 A generalization of the content part relation to richer languages that can be used for H-D confirmation,
e.g. languages with identity, is given in Gemes (1997). The definitions below are, with the exception of
Definition 2, taken from Gemes (2006). Quantifiers are treated substitutionally.
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Following Gemes (1993), we can improve on our original definition of H-D
confirmation by postulating
(H-D*) Evidence E confirms hypothesis H relative to background knowledge
K if and only if
1. H.K is consistent;
2. E is a content part of H.K (H.K `cp E);
3. K alone does not entail E.
5 Synthesizing Hempelian and H-D confirmation
Although (H-D*) solves the tacking by disjunction problem, it does not solve all
tacking paradoxes: the problem of irrelevant conjunctions persists. Observations of
a swinging pendulum still confirm the hypothesis that pendula are harmonic
oscillators and that all ravens are black. To rule out these problems, Gemes (1993)
has introduced ‘natural axiomatizations’ of a theory.
That strategy has its merits, but also its drawbacks (Schurz 2005). First, it is not
always clear which axiomatizations should count as natural and which don’t.
Second, Gemes’ account ends up with a rather complicated definition and is hard to
interpret intuitively. Keeping in mind Carnap’s (1950, § 3) requirement that
explications should be as simple as possible, we might decide to look for
alternatives (e.g., Schurz 1991). Unfortunately, these suggestions also fail to resolve
all objections satisfactorily (cf. Gemes 1998).
Let us return to the problem of irrelevant conjunctions. Hempel noticed that
under certain circumstances, general hypotheses may be confirmed by experimental
findings that support a more specific hypothesis. For example, evidence for
Galileo’s principle—that bodies of different mass fall with the same acceleration—
also supports Newton’s Law of Gravitation. In these cases, ‘the weaker hypothesis is
connected with the stronger one by a logical bond of a particular kind: it is
essentially a substitution instance of the stronger one’ (Hempel 1945/65, 32, my
emphasis).
Indeed, the tacking problem emerges because the evidence is only a partial
instance of the tacked hypothesis: Fa is no instance of H = V x: (Fx.Gx), etc. To
cure this problem without losing the H-D spirit of the confirmation relation, I
demand that the negation of the hypothesis, suitably restricted, be a content part of
the negation of the evidence. Formally, the condition reads
:E:K cp :HjE:K: ð1Þ
Here, ‘H|E’ refers to the development of H for the domain of E – that is, the set of
singular terms that are relevant to E. Now, if H is the compound of a ‘relevant’ and
an ‘irrelevant’ hypothesis, then the content part relation will not hold between :E:K
and :HjE:K, because the irrelevant conjunctions have been transformed into irrel-
evant disjunctions. For example, if H = V x: (Fx.Gx), E = Fa, and K ¼ >, then
:HjE:K ¼ :Fa _ :Ga is no content part of :E:K ¼ :Fa.
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Hence, (1) solves the tacking by conjunction problem and we can use this
condition in a definition of qualitative confirmation that synthesizes Hempelian and
H-D confirmation. Confirming evidence consists in predictions of H which form at
the same time instances of H:
(Syn) Evidence E confirms hypothesis H relative to background knowledge
K if and only if
• E is a content part of H.K (H.K `cp E), and
• :HjE:K is a content part of :E:K ð:E:K cp :HjE:KÞ.
(Syn) successfully copes with the tacking paradoxes, and in doing so, it improves
upon classical H-D confirmation as well as upon Hempel’s proposal. For instance,
in the raven paradox, (Syn) goes with the H-D account: E = Ra.Ba does not directly
confirm H = V x: (Rx ? Bx), but both E1 = Ba and E2 ¼ :Ra confirm H relative to
K1 = Ra and K2 ¼ :Ba, respectively. Notably, H is no longer confirmable by
known non-ravens whose color is subsequently observed, as it used to be the case in
Hempel’s own account.
However, (Syn) does not explain how different parts of a theory can be confirmed
by a body of composite evidence. This feature of (Syn) is particularly salient if we
examine the behavior of that account with respect to the confirmation of several
hypotheses at once. Assume that a biologist conducts a couple of experiments with a
cell culture. Unfortunately, she can use each cell only once, that is, for one
experiment. Reasonably, she partitions the cell culture into different groups and
performs experiment A with group 1, experiment B with group 2, and so on. If the
experiments are successful, they should, taken together, confirm the conjunction of
the hypotheses. In other words, if E1 confirms H1 and E2 confirms H2 for suitably
independent pieces of evidence, then E1.E2 should also confirm H1.H2.
4
Unfortunately, (Syn) violates this desideratum. For instance, E = Fa.Gb will not
confirm the hypothesis H = V x: (Fx.Gx) relative to K ¼ >. This is because the
evidence forms no full instance of H. But clearly, if the tested hypothesis consists of
two more or less independent statements, the focus on full instances of H is
misplaced. Thus, while (Syn) synthesizes Hempelian and H-D confirmation, we lack
an extension where the confirmation of independent hypotheses contributes to the
piecemeal confirmation of a theory which is composed of the former.
6 An Extension to Theory Confirmation
For extending (Syn) to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories, let us go back
to Hempel once more. For Hempel (1945/65), a theory is confirmed if it is entailed
by a set of sentences that are individually confirmed by the evidence. Following this
idea, I propose to construct a 1:1-match of theory and evidence: theories are
decomposed into their content parts which are, individually, confirmed by a specific
content part of the evidence. If all content parts of the theory are confirmed in this
4 This example is due to Ken Gemes.
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way, the entire theory is confirmed. For example, assume that we would like to
confirm Kepler’s Three Laws by means of observing the planetary orbits in the solar
system. Then we use the position of a single planet (say, Mars) at different points in
time to confirm the first two laws, whereas we use data about the orbital period and
the semi-major axis of two different planets (say, Jupiter and Saturn) in order to
confirm the Third Law.
In other words, I stipulate that evidence E confirms a theory T if (i) E is a content
part of T, and (ii) there is a decomposition of T into content parts H1; . . .; Hn such
that for each Hi, the evidence contains an instance of Hi.
This line of reasoning is condensed in the following definition:
(SynT) Evidence E confirms theory T relative to background knowledge K if
and only if
1. E is a content part of T.K (T.K `cp E);
2. There are wffs H1; . . .; Hn such that 8i : T cp Hi; H1; . . .; Hn  T , and there are
wffs Ei such that
• E `cp Ei, and
• :Ei:K cp ð:HiÞjEi :K.
To illustrate how (SynT) works, consider a medical trial. We would like to test
the theory T that only plasmodium parasites cause malaria in humans. More
precisely, the theory consists of the individual hypotheses H1, H2, H3, etc. that only
plasmodium parasites cause the different forms of malaria M1, M2, M3. We test
these hypotheses by scrutinizing patients that have been suffering from malaria,
sorting them into subtrials according to the kind of malaria Mi. If the individual
trials confirm the hypothesis (T:K cp E;:Ei:K cp ð:HiÞjEi :K), then we have also
confirmed our overarching theory, since the evidence of each trial Ei is a content
part of the total evidence. Furthermore, (SynT) solves our biologist’s problem: if
two different properties (F and G) are supposed to be demonstrated of a population,
we can decompose the composite hypothesis V x: Fx.Gx into its content parts V x: Fx
and V x: Gx, each of which is confirmed by a content part of the evidence (Fa and
Gb).
Summing up, (SynT) has a number of desirable implications. It solves the tacking
paradoxes, gives an account of how entire theories can be confirmed in a piecemeal
fashion, and does so using only a single technical concept: content part entailment, a
refinement of deductive entailment. A fortiori, we can also apply (SynT) to the
confirmation of single hypotheses.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I have synthesized Hempelian and H-D confirmation, that is,
confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions. I contend that
the reputation of qualitative confirmation as either hopeless or outdated is
unjustified: it can be defended against the prevalent objections. The main
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competitor on the quantitative side—Bayesianism—is an attractive framework for
modeling learning under uncertainty, but, as argued in Sect. 2, it misses the structure
of logical relations between theory and evidence. Since these relations often matter
for a better understanding of scientific evidence and scientific argumentation,
qualitative accounts should not be dismissed out of hand.
Building on earlier work by Gemes and Hempel, this paper proposes a new
account of qualitative confirmation: (SynT). This new account solves the tacking
paradoxes and covers the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. However, not
all consequences may be judged desirable. For instance, the confirmation of
existential statements remains difficult.
One might also object that our account is limited to theories with purely
observational content: since the evidence must be stated in terms of observational
properties, it is hard to see how :HjE (that may refer to unobservable properties) can
ever be a content part of :E. For instance, suppose that an electron is shot into an
electromagnetic field. It will then experience a Lorentz force and change its direction
accordingly. Then, :HjE seems to be a disjunction of an observable and a non-
observable proposition. So it cannot be a content part of the (purely observational):E.
However, this reasoning is delusive. If the electron experiences an electromagnetic
force, it will be deflected orthogonally to its original direction and to the electromagnetic
force lines. This follows directly from the formula for the Lorentz force F~ ¼
qðE~þ v~ B~Þ. Conversely, if the electron fails to move in that direction, we can
infer that there cannot have been an (unobservable) Lorentz force, and we can infer
:HjE from :E. Thus, the proposal also applies to theories with partly unobservable
content.
Unfortunately, an extension of (SynT) to non-monadic predicate calculus is far
from trivial. For example, H = V x, y: Rxy is not confirmed by Rab relative to
tautologous background knowledge because Rab does not constitute a full instance
of H. After all, we have not observed Raa, Rba, and Rbb. Similarly, hypotheses
without finite models cannot be confirmed. This property differs from classical
accounts of H-D confirmation such as Gemes (1993) and shows that the new
account is more restrictive than H-D confirmation. However, since (SynT) is a
merger of two traditions, this is not too surprising. It captures the idea that there is a
core concept of qualitative confirmation that can be extended into different
directions (confirmation by instances, or H-D confirmation). In this sense, I concur
with Gemes (1998, 8) that for accounts of confirmation, ‘it is better to be too
exclusive than too inclusive’. Time will tell whether (SynT) can be extended as to
address the aforementioned challenges.
On the whole, (SynT) is simpler and more straightforward than the rivalling
suggestions of Gemes (1993) and Schurz (1991), and it gives a satisfactory
treatment of paradigmatic problems such as the tacking paradoxes, the raven
paradox, and the confirmation of entire theories. Thus, it is explained how
successful predictions and instances of a hypothesis can both matter for the
confirmation of a theory, while at the same time solving the classical paradoxes and
modeling the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. That such a synthesis is
possible might help to explain why philosophers such as Hempel and Glymour
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searched for a single account of qualitative confirmation, rather than disentangling
both approaches.
All this does not imply that (SynT) is entirely unproblematic, and I have actually
mentioned some sources of worry. But first, none of these examples is clear and
conclusive enough to be a refutation of (SynT). Second, all available qualitative
accounts of confirmation have to struggle with some intuitively odd implications
and the charge of incompleteness.5 Third, bringing an account in line with all our
intuitions usually comes at the expense of simplicity, transparency and conceptual
parsimony, as visible in the proposals by Gemes and Schurz. Given that (SynT) is so
much simpler than the best proposals in the literature, I conclude that it adds
considerable value to our theorizing about qualitative confirmation.
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